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ABSTRACT
This paper considers four models in which immortal agents face idiosyncratic shocks and trade only
a single risk-free asset over time. The four models specify this single asset to be private bonds,
public bonds, public money, or private money respectively. I prove that, given an equilibrium in
one of these economies, it is possible to pick the exogenous elements in the other three economies so
that there is an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in each of them. (The term "exogenous variables"
refers to the limits on private issue of money or bonds, or the supplies of publicly issued bonds or
money.)
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edge the support of NSF 06-06695. The views expressed herein are mine and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
In this paper, I examine four diﬀerent models of asset trade. In all of them, immortal
agents face idiosyncratic shocks to tastes and/or productivities. They can trade a single
risk-free asset over time. Preferences and risks are the same in all four models. The models
diﬀer in their speciﬁcation of what this single asset is.
In the ﬁrst two models, agents trade interest-bearing bonds. In the ﬁrst model,
agents can trade one period risk-free bonds available in zero net supply, subject to person-
independent borrowing restrictions. In the second model, agents can trade one period risk-free
bonds available in positive net supply, but they cannot short-sell the asset. A government
pays the interest on these bonds, and regulates their supply, by using time-dependent taxes
that are the same for all agents.
In the other two models, agents can trade money. Money is an asset that lasts forever,
but pays no dividend. It plays no special role in transactions. In the third model, money is
in positive supply. A government regulates its supply using lump-sum taxes. In the fourth
model, there is no government. Agents can issue and redeem private money, subject to a
period-by-period constraint on the diﬀerence between past issue and past redemption.
These models are designed to be closely related to ones already in the literature. The
ﬁrst model is essentially the famous Aiyagari-Bewley model of self-insurance. The second
model is motivated by Aiyagari and McGrattan’s (1998) study of the optimal quantity of
government debt. The third model is a version of Lucas’ (1980) pure currency economy.
It is used by Imrohoroglu (1992) in her study of the welfare costs of inﬂation. The fourth
model is more novel, although of course many authors have been interested in comparing
the consequences of using inside instead of outside money (see, for example, Cavalcanti and
Wallace (1999)).
The basic lesson of this prior literature is that the exact nature of the traded asset
has important eﬀects on model outcomes. In Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) (and later Shin
(2006)), public debt issue generates welfare costs that do not occur in models with private
debt. Lucas (1980) argues that agents cannot achieve as much with money as with private
debt, saying explicitly, "There is a sense in which money is a second-rate asset." Cavalcanti
and Wallace (1999) argue that using inside (privately issued) money allows agents to achievemore than outside money.
In contrast, I prove the following equivalence theorem. Take an equilibrium in any of
the four economies. Then, it is possible to specify the exogenous elements of the other three
economies so that there is an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in each. Here, by "exogenous
elements," I mean speciﬁcally:
1. borrowing limits in the ﬁrst model
2. bond supplies in the second model
3. money supplies in the third model
4. money issue limits in the fourth model.
In fact, the equivalence is actually even stronger: in all of these outcome-equivalent equilibria,
agents have identical choice sets as in the original equilibrium.
Why is my result so diﬀerent from the lesson of the prior literature? In the earlier
analyses, the models with diﬀerent assets also impose diﬀerent assumptions on the nature
of what might be termed the repayment or collection technology. For example, in models
with private risk-free debt, the borrower must make a repayment that is independent of the
borrower’s decisions or shocks. In essence, the lender is essentially able to impose a lump-
sum tax on the borrower at the time of repayment. In models with public risk-free debt, like
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), the government makes a repayment that is independent of
any aggregate shocks. However, it is typically assumed that the government must use linear
taxes to collect the resources for its repayments. This restriction to linear taxes means that
government repayment of public debts must distort agents’ decisions in a way that is not true
of private debt repayment. The treatment of taxes in models with outside money is often
even more drastic; thus, in their models, Lucas (1980), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) and
Kocherlakota (2003) all assume that the government can use no taxes other than inﬂation
taxes.
In this paper, I eliminate these diﬀerences across the models in their speciﬁcation of
the repayment technology. In particular, I assume in the models with public debt issue that
the government is able to levy a head tax — that is, a lump-sum tax that is the same for all
agents. (Note that given the potential heterogeneity in the model setting, the government
2cannot generally implement a ﬁrst-best outcome using the (uniform) head tax.) Once I endow
the government with this instrument, I can prove the equivalence theorem.
The theorem really contains two distinct results. First, I show that the public issue
and private issue of bonds/money are equivalent to one another. In this equivalence, the
above head tax plays a key role. In the models with public issue, the government uses a head
tax that is exactly equal to the interest payment made by a borrower in the private-issue
economy who holds the maximal level of debt in each period. It is in this sense that the
collection powers of the private sector and public sector are the same. Of course, these
collection powers may well be limited by enforcement problems of various kinds; the crucial
assumption is that the enforcement problems are the same in the private and public sectors.
Second, the theorem shows that risk-free bonds and money are equivalent to one
another. The key to this demonstration is that money can have a positive real rate of return
even though it does not pay dividends. This price rise can occur in equilibrium in the third
model if the government shrinks the supply of money using the head tax. The size of the
needed head tax is exactly the same as in the economy with public debt issue. It can occur
in the fourth model if the limits on net money issue are shrinking over time.
The theorem is related to Wallace’s (1981) famous Modigliani-Miller theorem for open
market operations. Wallace proves that the money/bond composition of a government’s debt
portfolio does not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. Like my theorem, Wallace’s relies on two
crucial assumptions. First, as noted above, the government must have access to lump-sum
taxes. Second, money cannot have a transactions advantage over bonds. This assumption
is not satisﬁed by cash-in-advance, money-in-the-utility function, or transaction cost models.
Like Wallace’s paper, mine is also closely related to Barro’s (1974) analysis of government
debt.
Taub (1994) poses the question, "Are currency and credit equivalent mechanisms?"
that motivates this paper. As I do, he answers this question aﬃrmatively. However, he
conﬁnes his analysis to a rather special example (linear utility). Levine (1991) and Green
and Zhou (2005) use linear utility examples to demonstrate how a government using public
money issue can achieve a ﬁrst-best outcome in a world in which agents experience shocks to
their need for consumption. In their examples, the government achieves this good outcome by
3using an inﬂationary monetary policy. My theorem demonstrates that the government could
instead use an appropriate debt policy, or that private agents could achieve this desirable
outcome with appropriately set borrowing limits.
2. Setup
Consider an inﬁnite horizon environment with a unit measure of agents in which time
is indexed by the natural numbers. At the beginning of period 1, for each agent, Nature
draws an inﬁnite sequence (θt)∞
t=1 from the set Θ∞, where Θ is ﬁnite. The draws are i.i.d.
across agents, with measure μ. Hence, there is no aggregate risk. At the beginning of period
t, a given agent observes his own realization of θt; his information at date t consists of the
history θ
t =( θ1,...,θt).





where ct is the agent’s consumption in period t, yt is the agent’s output in period t, and
0 <β<1. The agent’s utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing in ct,s t r i c t l y
decreasing in yt, and is a function of the realization of θt.
I then consider four diﬀerent (possibly incomplete markets) trading structures embed-
ded in this setting.
A. Private-Bond Economy
The ﬁrst market structure is a private-bond economy. It is completely characterized by





t+1 ∈ R+. (Note that the borrowing
limits are the same for all agents in all periods.) At each date, the agents trade one-period
risk-free real bonds in zero net supply for consumption. They are initially endowed with zero
units of bonds each. Each agent’s bond-holdings in period t must be no smaller than −B
priv
t+1
(as measured in terms of consumption in that period).
In this economy, individuals take interest rates r =( rt)∞
t=1,r t ∈ R, as given and then
choose consumption, output, and bond-holdings (c,y,b)=( ct,y t,b t+1)∞
t=1, (ct,y t,b t+1):Θt →
4R2




















t) ≥ 0 ∀(θ
t,t≥ 1)
b1 =0
An equilibrium in a private-bond economy Bpriv is a speciﬁcation of (c,y,b,r) such that








The second is a public-bond economy. At each date, there is a government that sells
one-period risk-free real bonds. The economy is completely characterized by an exogenously
speciﬁed bond supply sequence Bpub =( B
pub
t )∞
t=1,w h e r eB
pub
t+1 ∈ R+ and an initial period
return r0. The government raises B
pub
t+1 units of consumption in period t by selling one-period
risk-free bonds. It collects τb
t units of consumption from each agent; the tax is the same for all
agents, and is determined endogenously in equilibrium.1 Each agent is initially endowed with
bonds that pay oﬀ B
pub
1 (1+r0) units of consumption. At each date, agents trade consumption
and the government-issued bonds. Agents are not allowed to short-sell these bonds.
In this economy, the individuals take interest rates r =( rt)∞
t=1 as given and then choose








1Taxes are endogenously determined in this public-bond economy and in the public-money economy dis-
cussed in the next section. It is important to note that the main equivalence theorem is valid even if taxes
are exogenously speciﬁed. I treat taxes as endogenous so as to ensure that the government ﬂow budget


















t) ≥ 0 ∀θ
t,t≥ 1
An equilibrium in a public-bond economy (Bpub,r 0) is a speciﬁcation of (c,y,b,r,τbond) such








t+1 for all t







t (1 + rt−1)
C. Public-Money Economy
The third economy is a public-money economy. By money, I mean an inﬁnitely-lived
asset that pays no dividends. Each agent is initially endowed with M
pub
1 units of money.
Then, the economy is completely characterized by an exogenously speciﬁed money supply
sequence Mpub =( M
pub
t+1)∞
t=1,w h e r eM
pub
t+1 ∈ R+.I n p e r i o d t,t h eg o v e r n m e n tc o l l e c t sτmon
t
units of consumption from each agent; again, the taxes are the same for all agents, and are
determined endogenously in equilibrium. At each date, agents trade money and consumption;
the government trades so as to ensure that there are M
pub
t+1 units of money outstanding.
In this economy, the individuals take money prices p as given and then choose con-

























t) ≥ 0 ∀(θ
t,t≥ 1)
6An equilibrium in a public-money economy (Mpub) is a speciﬁcation of (c,y,M,p,τmon) such














t pt − M
pub
t+1pt
There is no cash-in-advance constraint or any transaction cost advantage associated
with money in this setting.
D. Private Money Economy
The fourth and ﬁnal economy is a private-money economy. In this economy, there
is no government. Agents are able to issue their money in exchange for consumption, and
redeem others’ monies in exchange for consumption. However, in each history, they face
an exogenous upper bound on the net amount of money issue that they have done in their







In this economy, the individuals take money prices p as given and then choose con-
sumption, how much money to issue and how much money to redeem. (I assume that all
monies are traded at the same price p; there may be other equilibria in which this restriction









































An equilibrium in a private-money economy (Mpriv) is a speciﬁcation of (c,y,Mred,Miss,p)













Again, there is no cash-in-advance constraint or transaction cost advantages associated
with money in this setting.
3. Example Economy
In this section, I work through an example of the above general structure that il-
lustrates the general equivalence theorem that follows in the next section. I start with an
equilibrium in a private-bond economy. I then construct a public-bond economy, a public-
money economy, and a private-money economy. I show that in each of these economies,
there is an equilibrium with the same consumption allocation as the original, private-bond,
equilibrium. Even more strongly, agents have exactly the same budget sets in each of these
equilibria.
In the example, output is inelastically supplied. Half of the agents receive an endow-
ment stream of the form (1 + h,1,1,....) and the other half get an endowment stream of the
form (1 − h,1,1,...), where 1 >h>0. I will call the ﬁrst half "rich" and the second half







Consider ﬁrst a private-bond economy in which the borrowing limit B
priv
t+1 is constant
at βλ(1−β)−1, where (1−β) <λ<1. We can construct an equilibrium in this economy as
follows. Set the interest rate rt to be constant at 1/β − 1. Rich agents consume a constant
amount cr,w h e r e
c
r =( 1+h)(1 − β)+β =1+h(1 − β)
8Rich agents’ bond-holdings br
t+1 equal
βh





for period t ≥ 1. Note that the borrowing limit has been chosen so that it never binds in
equilibrium.
It is readily checked that the above speciﬁcation forms an equilibrium. Markets clear.








t+1 − 1 − b
r
tβ
−1 =0 for all t ≥ 2
and similarly for poor agents. Because the borrowing limit does not bind, the agents’ Euler
equations are satisﬁed. We need only check the agents’ transversality conditions, which are















are both equal to zero.
B. Public-Bond Economy
I now want to design a public-bond economy with an outcome-equivalent equilibrium.
In a public-bond economy, agents are not allowed to borrow. Hence, to get a non-autarkic
equilibrium, there must be a positive amount of debt outstanding. I set B
pub
t = βλ(1 − β)−1
(the private economy borrowing limit) for all t and r0 =1 /β −1. As above, we can construct
an equilibrium in this economy in which the equilibrium interest rate rt is constant at 1/β−1.
Rich agents consume cr (as deﬁned above) in each period, and poor agents consume cp in
9each period. Each agent pays a lump-sum tax τb
t = λ at every date. Then, in period t ≥ 1,
rich agents’ bond-holdings br
t+1 equal
βh+ βλ(1 − β)
−1
and poor agents’ bond-holdings b
p
t+1 equal
−βh+ βλ(1 − β)
−1
Note that the agents’ bond-holdings are always positive.
Again, it is simple to verify that these interest rates and quantities form an equilibrium.









=1 + h(1 − β)+hβ + βλ(1 − β)
−1 − 1 − h − λ(1 − β)
−1 + λ
=0 .









=1 + h(1 − β)+hβ + βλ(1 − β)
−1 − 1 − h − λ(1 − β)
−1 + λ
=0 .
We can check the poor agents’ ﬂow constraints in a similar fashion.
The agents’ Euler equations are clearly satisﬁed, because their no-short-sales constraint















Hence, there is an equilibrium in this public-bond economy with the same consumption
allocation as the original, private-bond, equilibrium.
10C. Public-Money Economy
I now want to design a public-money economy with an outcome-equivalent equilibrium.
Clearly, the gross rate of return on money must be β
−1, in order to satisfy the agents’ ﬁrst-
order conditions. Since money pays no dividend, this rate of return implies that the price
of money must rise at rate β









to be satisﬁed. This requires that the money stock must converge to zero over time.




β)−1. I claim that there is an equilibrium in this economy in which pt = β
−t for all t. Rich
agents consume cr in each period, and poor agents consume cp in each period. As in the
public-bond economy, each agent pays a lump-sum tax τmon
t = λ at every date. Then, in













To verify the claim that these prices and quantities form an equilibrium, note that
markets clear and that individual Euler equations are satisﬁed. Clearly, the transversality
conditions are also satisﬁed, because the money supply converges to zero. Finally, we can ver-













−1) − 1 − h − λ(1 − β)
−1 + λ
=0 .












−1) − 1 − (h + λ(1 − β)
−1)+λ
=0 .
The poor agents’ ﬂow constraints are similar.
Money pays no dividend and has no liquidity beneﬁts. Nonetheless, money has a
positive value in this equilibrium. This positive value seems to create the possibility for an
arbitrage, in which a given agent permanently reduces his money-holdings by a small amount
ε. However, this arbitrage is infeasible, because the supply of money eventually falls to zero.
D. Private-Money Economy
Finally, I design a private-money economy that induces the same equilibrium con-




Then, I claim that there is an equilibrium in this economy in which pt = β
−t for all t. Rich
agents consume cr in each period, and poor agents consume cp in each period. In period 1,
poor agents issue M
iss,p
2 = β
2h and rich agents redeem M
red,r
2 = β
2h. In period t>1, poor
agents redeem M
red,p
t+1 = h(1 − β)β
t a n dr i c ha g e n t si s s u eM
iss,r
t+1 = h(1 − β)β










2h(1 − β) − β
3h(1 − β) − ... − β
th(1 − β)=β
t+1h
which is less than β
t+1λ(1 − β)−1. In this private-money economy, neither rich nor poor
agents ever have net money issue equal to β
t. Hence, the bound on money issue never binds
in equilibrium.
We can verify the validity of this putative equilibrium as follows. Markets clear, and





2 − 1 − h − p1M
iss,r
2
=1 + h(1 − β)+βh− 1 − h
=0 .




t+1 − 1 − ptM
iss,r
t+1
=1 + h(1 − β) − h(1 − β) − 1
=0 .
The poor agents’ ﬂow constraints can be checked in a similar fashion.























In this economy, money has a positive value and pays no dividends. Why is it not
optimal for an agent to issue ε units more money in period 1? Issuing ε more units of money
in period 1 means that the agent’s net money issue would be ε + β
t+1h in period t. But for
large t, this amount will exceed the upper bound on money issue. Put another way, even
though it never binds, the money issue constraint is structured so that agents must eventually
redeem whatever currency they have issued.
E. Budget Set Equivalence
The arguments above establish that the equilibrium outcomes are identical across the
four economies. But, with some algebra, it is possible to prove an even stronger equivalence:
the equilibrium budget sets of (c,y) are the same across the four economies. Agents are
confronted with exactly the same sets of possible choices in the four economies. As we shall
see, this deeper isomorphism can be generalized.
4. An Equivalence Theorem
In this section, I prove the main theorem in the paper. The theorem starts with an
equilibrium (c,y,b,r) in a private-bond economy deﬁned by Bpriv. It then shows how, by
translating the bond-holdings upward by Bpriv and crafting taxes in the right way, we can
13get an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in the public-bond economy. The key to the theorem
is that these taxes equal the net interest payments on the bond-holding limits.
Then, the theorem goes on to show that, by setting monetary policy in the right way,
we can design an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in the public-money economy. The key here
is that monetary policy must be designed so that the price level falls at the rate of interest,
and the real value of aggregate money-holdings always equals aggregate bond-holdings. As
we will see later, this will typically mean that aggregate money-holdings will be shrinking
(but not necessarily at the Friedman Rule 1/β − 1).
Finally, the theorem turns to the private-money economy. Here, I set the upper bounds
on net real money issue equal to the borrowing limit in the private-bond economy. By doing
so, I can induce an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in this setting.2











t=1 are sequences such that
for all t:
pt =( 1 + rt−1)pt−1; p1 = M
pub



















t (1 + rt−1) − B
pub
t+1
Then the following four statements are equivalent.
1. (c,y,b,r) is an equilibrium in a private-bond economy deﬁned by Bpriv.
2. (c,y,b+Bpriv,r,τbond) is an equilibrium in a public-bond economy deﬁned by Bpub and
r0.
3. (c,y,(b + Bpriv)/p,p,τmon) is an equilibrium in a public-money economy deﬁned by
Mpub.
4. (c,y,Mred,Miss,p) is an equilibrium in a private-money economy deﬁned by Mpriv,












2The proof of this theorem relies on techniques similar to those that I use in Kocherlakota (forthcoming).
14Proof. I ﬁrst prove the equivalence of statements 1 and 2. Pick an element (b c,b b) of an agent’s







t+1 ,t≥ 1,all θ
t
My claim is that (b c, b y,b b0) is in the agent’s budget set in the public-bond economy. Obviously,
b b0
t+1(θ
t) ≥ 0, because b bt+1(θ
t) ≥− B
priv





t) − b yt(θ












t) − (1 + rt−1)b bt(θ







t) − b yt(θ
t) − (1 + rt−1)b bt(θ
t−1)
≤ 0 for all θ
t
We can use similar logic to check the ﬂow budget constraint for t =1 :
b c1(θ1)+b b
0
2(θ1) − b y1(θ1) − B
pub
1 (1 + r0)+τ
bond
1
= b c1(θ1)+b b2(θ1)+B
priv
2 − b y1(θ1) − B
pub
1 (1 + r0)+τ
bond
1
= b c1(θ1)+b b2(θ1) − b y1(θ1) ≤ 0
for all (θ1). Running the steps in reverse establishes the converse. Hence, the agent’s budget
sets are (c,y)-equivalent in the two economies. But it is then straightforward to see that
statements 1 and 2 are equivalent.
I now prove the equivalence of statements 2 and 3. Pick an element (b c, b y,b b0) of an
agent’s budget set in the public-bond economy. Deﬁne c Mt+1 = b b0
t+1/pt. I claim that (b c, b y, c M)




t)pt − b yt(θ
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15In period 1, we can verify
b c1(θ1)+ c M2(θ1)p1 − b y1(θ1) − M
pub
1 p1 + τ
mon
1
= b c1(θ1)+b b
0






for all (θ1). We can run the logic in reverse to check the converse. Thus, the agent’s budget
sets are (c,y)-equivalent; this in turn establishes that statements 2 and 3 are equivalent.
Finally, I prove the equivalence of statements 1 and 4. Pick an element (b c, b y,b b) of an
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2 (θ1)=m a x ( b b2(θ1),0)/p1
M
iss
2 (θ1)=m a x ( −b b2(θ1),0)/p1













t) − (1 + rt−1)b bt(θ




t) and in period 1, for all (θ1):
b c1(θ1)+M
red
2 (θ1)p1 − b y1(θ1) − M
iss
2 (θ1)p1
































This conﬁrms that the budget-feasible consumptions in the private-bond economy are a subset
of the budget-feasible consumption set in the private-money economy. Conversely, suppose

















t) − b yt(θ

































t)) − b yt(θ
t)
≤ 0
In period 1,f o ra n y(θ1):
b c1(θ1)+b b2(θ1) − b y1(θ1)
= b c1(θ1,y 1)+p1(M
red
2 (θ1) − M
iss
2 (θ1)) − b y1(θ1)
≤ 0
Agent j’s bond-holdings b b clearly satisfy the borrowing limit −Bpriv.H e n c e ,(b c, b y,b b) is budget-
17feasible in the private-bond economy. The budget sets are (c,y)-equivalent. It follows that
Statements 1 and 4 are equivalent. QED
5. Discussion
In this section, I discuss several aspects of Theorem 1.
A. Equivalences
Theorem 1 establishes two kinds of equivalences. The ﬁrst is between private issue and
public issue (of money or bonds). Consider, for example, a private-bond economy in which
agents have a constant borrowing limit Bpriv. In this economy, all agents begin with the
same holdings of bonds (zero). They can run down their holdings to −Bpriv. Now, consider
a public-bond economy in which all agents begin their lives by holding Bpriv units of bonds.
They face taxes with present value equal to Bpriv and can run down their holdings to zero. In
the public-bond economy, agents’ initial wealths are the same as in the private debt economy.
As well, they can run down their initial bond-holdings by exactly the same amount (Bpriv)
as in the private debt economy. Hence, their budget sets are the same in the two kinds of
economies.3
The second kind of equivalence is between monetary economies and bond economies.
Consider a public-bond economy in which the equilibrium rate of return is constant at r>0,
and the value of outstanding public debt is constant at Bpub. Theorem 1 designs a public-
money economy in which the equilibrium rate of return is also r, and value of outstanding
public obligations (now in the form of money) is Bpub. In this public-money economy, the
price of money must rise at rate r. Hence, the quantity of money must fall at this same rate.
The government sucks out this money using the same taxes that it used to ﬁnance its interest
payments in the public-bond economy.
It is worth pointing out that the proof of Theorem 1 establishes a stronger result than
Theorem 1 itself. The statement of Theorem 1 is that the equilibrium outcomes across the
3It is possible to extend Theorem 1 to include model economies in which agents can trade both public and
private debt. In particular, suppose there is an equilibrium (c,y,b,r) in a private-bond economy deﬁned by
the sequence Bpriv. Suppose too that there is an economy in which the sequence of supplies of outside debt
is given by Bpub0 and the borrowing limit sequence is given by Bpriv0. Then, there is an equilibrium with
allocation (c,y) in this latter private-public bond economy if Bpub0 + Bpriv0 = Bpriv in all periods.
18four economies are the same in terms of (c,y). Actually, the proof establishes a much stronger
result: the equilibrium budget sets of (c,y) are the same in the four economies. Agents face
exactly the same choice problems in the four equilibria of the four economies.
It is possible to extend Theorem 1 to include model economies in which agents can
trade both public and private debt. In particular, suppose there is an equilibrium (c,y,b,r) in
a private-bond economy deﬁned by the sequence Bpriv. Suppose too that there is an economy
in which the sequence of supplies of outside debt is given by Bpub0 and the borrowing limit
sequence is given by Bpriv0. Then, there is an equilibrium with allocation (c,y) in this latter
private-public bond economy if Bpub0 + Bpriv0 = Bpriv in all periods. Public and private debt
are perfect substitutes.
B. Lump-Sum Taxes
A key element of the proof of Theorem 1 is that the taxes τmon and τbond don’t depend
on y; hence, they are lump-sum. These lump-sum taxes simply give the government similar
collection powers to those of the private sector. In particular, consider an equilibrium
(c,y,b,r) in a private bond economy deﬁned by Bpriv. In this equilibrium, a borrower may
owe as much as
B
priv
t+1 (1 + rt)
in period (t +1 ) . The borrower can only borrow up to B
priv
t+2 to repay this loan. Hence, a
lender must be able to collect
B
priv
t+1 (1 + rt) − B
priv
t+2
in period (t+1). This collection limit is independent of decisions about (c,y) being made by
the borrower. In this sense, lenders are able to levy a lump-sum tax on the borrower equal
to B
priv
t+1 (1 + rt) − B
priv
t+2 in period (t +1 ) .
This collection limit is exactly equal to τbond and τmon in the equivalent public bond
and money economies constructed in Theorem 1. Hence, by assuming that the government
can levy taxes equal to τbond and τmon, I am assuming that the government can levy the same
lump-sum taxes as can a private lender. This means, for example, that the private and public
sector must face the same limits on enforcement across the two kinds of models.
19In reality, governments can use a broader range of taxes than is assumed in the above
economies. More generally, suppose that in all four economies, the government can use any
element of a class C of tax schedules ψ = {ψt}∞
t=1, where an agent who has production history
yt in period t pays a tax ψt(yt). We can prove a version of Theorem 1 if C is closed under the
addition of a sequence of constants, so that if α = {αt}∞
t=1 ∈ R∞, and ψt(yt) − ψ
0
t(yt)=αt
for all t,yt, then
ψ ∈ C =⇒ ψ
0 ∈ C
For example, the class C may consist of the aﬃne tax codes discussed by Werning (forthcom-
ing).4
C. Multiple Equilibria
The equivalence described in Theorem 1 is limited in the following way. Suppose c
is an equilibrium consumption allocation in a public-money economy deﬁned by Mpub and
τ. Then, Theorem 1 says that there is an outcome-equivalent equilibrium outcome in the
private debt economy deﬁned by Bpriv. The theorem does not say that the sets of equilibrium
outcomes are the same in the two economies.
The following example makes this point more forcefully.
Example 1. Suppose that Θ = {1,2}, that θt =1for all t with probability 1/2, and that
θt =2for all t with probability 1/2. Suppose that u(c,y)=l n ( c), so that output is inelastically
supplied and β>1/2. Finally, suppose that for all agents, yt = θ1 if t is odd and yt =3−θ1
if t is even.
Consider a public-money economy in which M
pub
t =1for all t. It is well-known that
there are (at least) two equilibria in this economy. In the one equilibrium, pt =0for all t,
and ct = yt for all t. In the other equilibrium:
p1 =( 4 β − 2)/(5 + 2β)
4To impose lump-sum taxes in the public-money economy, the government must be able to threaten agents
with some kind of penalty if they fail to pay those taxes. Kocherlakota (2003) and Berentsen and Waller
(2006) argue that these penalties could be used to enforce cross-agent transfers of resources, and thereby
eliminate the need for money altogether. However, to ensure that there is no need for money, the government
must be able to impose an arbitrarily large penalty, and know the realization of θ for each agent. Neither of
these assumptions is implied by the government’s being able to levy a particular lump-sum tax of size τmon.
20pt = p
∗ ≡ (2β − 1)/(2 + 2β),t > 1
c1(2) = 2 − p1;c1(1) = 1 + p1
c2t+1(2) = c2t(1) = 2 − 2p
∗,t=1 ,2,3,...
c2t(2) = c2t+1(1) = 1 + 2p
∗,t=1 ,2,3...
(Here, ct(y) is consumption in period t if y1 = y.) In this latter equilibrium, the two agents
swap the money stock back and forth in exchange for consumption.




for all t. There is an equilibrium in this economy of the form
r1 =( 1− 2β)/(4 + 4β)
rt =0 ,t > 1
c1(2) = 2 − p1;c1(1) = 1 + p1
c2t+1(2) = c2t(1) = 2 − 2p
∗,t=1 ,2,3,..
c2t(2) = c2t+1(1) = 1 + 2p
∗,t=1 ,2,3...
This equilibrium is consumption-equivalent to the second equilibrium in the public-money
economy. (In this equilibrium, the poor agents (with income 1) borrow as much as possible in
each period.) However, in the private bond economy, there is no autarkic equilibrium. Hence,
the set of equilibrium outcomes is not the same as in the original public-money economy.
D. Welfare Implications
Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) consider a setup in which agents have hidden endow-
ments and store secretly over time. They prove that, under weak conditions, the symmetric
Pareto optimum is the equilibrium outcome of risk-free borrowing and lending, subject to the
natural borrowing constraint. The analysis in this paper shows that this symmetric Pareto
optimum could also be implemented as an equilibrium in an economy in which agents can
only hold money. Note that the rate of return on money in this economy is necessarily less
t h a nt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e .
21Aiyagari (1995) studies the properties of optimal capital income taxes in economies of
this kind (in which agents trade only capital and risk-free bonds, and face shocks to their labor
productivities). Aiyagari (1995) ﬁnds that the optimal capital income tax rate is positive,
and the equilibrium interest rate in the economy is less than the rate of time preference.
Using the logic of Theorem 1, one could redo Aiyagari’s analysis in a public-money economy.
Aiyagari’s result implies that in such a setting, the optimal rate of return on money is less
t h a nt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e . 5
6. Conclusions
In this paper, I make two key assumptions. First, I assume that the private and
public sectors have the same collection powers. Second, I assume that money has no distinct
transaction advantage over bonds. Under these two assumptions, I am able to establish an
isomorphism across a broad class of one-asset incomplete markets economies.
In reality, the collection powers of the private and public sector may well diﬀer, and
money almost certainly does provide liquidity beneﬁts that bonds do not. A great deal
of attention has been given to modelling and understanding the latter phenomenon. In
light of the theorem in this paper, the former issue seems an especially important one for
understanding the impact of government ﬁnancing decisions.
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